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THE PRESENT PAPER 15 the first of several that are being
developed by the Financial Research Program on the general
subject of the effect of war on banking. These studies, which
have been made possible by grants from the Association of
Reserve City Bankers and the Rockefeller Foundation, are to
be published as National Bureau Occasional Papers in a
special series entitled "Our Economy in War." Subsequent
papers will consider the effects of war on the moneysupply,
central banking, bank loans and investments, the structure of
interest rates, and the solvency and liquidity of banks; the
Canadian and British war credit organization will also be
examined, as will the effects of war on the financial structure
of business.
The broad questions of fiscal policy and war finance were
analyzed in a recent National Bureau volume sponsored by
the Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy, entitled Fiscal
Planning for Total War, in the preparation of which William
Leonard Crum, John F. Fennelly and Lawrence H. Seltzer
collaborated. The present study does not go into these larger
problems, but deals exclusively with the relation of war.
finance to the functioning of the banking system. Its author,
Dr. Charles R. Whittlesey, is Professor ofFinance and Eco-
nomics in the Wharton School of Finance and Commercein
the University of Pennsylvania. In the collectionand prepara-
tion of material he was assisted by Edith Elbogenand Willis
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V. SOURCES OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AND OF TAXThe Banking System and War Finance
THE WAR OF 1917-18 was by far the most expensivethis coun-
try had ever known. Yet the cost of that war,which seemed so
tremendous at the time, appears small in comparisonwith the
cost of the present struggle. Total expendituresof the federal
government in the fiscal year 1942-43 willexceed our total
national income in 191'7-18 by more than half,'and ,vill, in
fact, be greater than our total national income in any year
prior to 1941-42. The deficit for the fiscal year 1942-43is
expected to be in the neighborhood of 6o billion dollars, or
over four and a half timesthe deficit for 1918-19. The addi-
tion to our national debt in the single year 1942-43will be
considerably more than double the total nationaldebt
accumulated as a result of the last war.
For a number of reasons the commercial banksof the coun-
try occupy a key position in the programof Treasury borrow-
ing. They are by far the largest purchasersof government
obligations, and, in addition, they constitute the mostim-
portant single outlet for the saleof government obligations
to the public. Moreover, upontheir smooth functioning
depends the possibility that the tremendous shiftingabout
of funds may be accomplished without surfeits orstringencies
of cash funds, either generally or locally.Finally, the needs
of private customers must be servedwhere consistent with
war objectives, andtheir interests safeguarded in both the
immediate and the more distant future.
1COMMERCIAL BANKS AND WAR FiNANCING
In the two decades from 1921 tO 1940 inclusive theaverage
annual total of new security flotations, both bonds andstocks,
was 4.1 billion dollars. The maximum for any singleyear of
this period was 10.2 billion, reached in 1929, and thehighest
figure for any year after 1932 was 2.4 billion in 1938.In a
single month of 1942, on the other hand, the Treasurysold
securities amounting to nearly 13 billion dollars. Thiswas
the largest borrowing operation in history; but itwas only
an incident in the larger program of war financing.
The Sale of Bonds to the Public
In both world wars the commercial banks haveplayed a
leading part in Treasury financing. In thepresent war, how.
ever, bank lending to the government has been theirmost
important function, whereas in the lastwar this was less prom-
inent than their aid in the sale of securitiesto the public. At
the start of financing the First World War itwas decided that
the Treasury and the Federal ReserveBanks should notpar-
ticipate in the actual sale of bondsto the public; their activ-
ities were directed, instead, towardproblems of organization
and administration. Accordingly, thesale of bonds to the
public devolved upon localcommittees and the banks.
One of the initial steps in preparingfor the First Liberty
Loan was to set upan organization to conduct the selling
program. This organization, whichwas divided into twelve
groups corresponding to the twelve FederalReserve Districts,
was very largely under the supervisionand diTection of
bankers. The most importantof the regional groupsimpor-
tant particularly in terms of totalsaleshad its center in New
York.2 Under the supervisionof the central group in New
York, volunteer committeeswere formed in different occupa-
tions to assist in the saleof securities, andteams of bond
salesmen conducteda house-to-house canvass. Representatives
from investment bankingplayed a particularly activerole in
the selling organization.Sub-committees carried the campaign
into all parts of theReserve District.
2
SOne of the basic features of the bond selling program was
the reliance upon quotas. A quota committee was appointed
by the Federal Reserve Bank of each District to allocate
quotas among the states in the District. State committees
made allocations among the counties, and county chairmen
apportioned quotas among towns and communities. Local
committees composed chiefly of bankers- whose names were
not made public - decided upon the quotas of individuals.
Regional quotas. were detennined originally on the basis
of relative holdings of bank assets, and the same method was
used in assigning community quotas. In the course of time,
however, this basis was supplemented by others. By the time
of the Fourth Liberty Loan the formula for determining
regional quotas was: bank assets 20 percent; population 20
percent; and value of real estate 6o percent.
Individual quotas were based on estimated ability to sub-
scribe. This was calulated on the basis of bank balances,
investments, real estate income and other information known
to the committee. Once the quota was established, individuals
were expected to subscribe that amount, or show why they
should not. In many instances this involved a degree of social
pressure that stopped little short of outright compulsion.
One writer described it as "borrowing with a club." It was
part of the general policy followed at the time, and was not
confined to particular areas or groups.3
Complaints were frequent that individual and community
quotas were unfair, but on the whole the system seems to have
functioned surprisingly well. One of the chief criticisms was
that the method served to discourage subscriptions in excess
of the quota: it had been hoped that the quota would be
viewed as the minimum amount to be subscribed, but it was
more frequently looked upon as a maximum. Furthermore,
if an individual subscribed more than his quota it often
happened that the quota was raised the next time; this higher
quota might then be excessive, and at any rate the individual
would lose the recognition and satisfaction he might other-
wise have had from exceeding his quota.
3The work of marketing government securities, whichwas
so largely handled by representatives of banks and investment
houses, was furthered by special bond purchase plans andby
various services performed free of charge by the banksin
connection with the purchase and care of securitiessub-
scribed to by the public. Banks helped to educate thepublic
as to method and procedure; they took charge ofcorrespon.
dence in connection with conversions; theysent out notices;
they stood ready with information and advice.
In the course of time a number of major changestook place
in the methods employed in the loan campaigns.There was
a tendency to enlarge the different regionalgroups and to
organize them more intensively. At the timeof the Third
Liberty Loan a permanent body of paidemployees was
created, and the use of volunteerswas thereafter confined to
the actual sales drives. The costs involved inmaintaining the
paid staff were met by the Treasury. Atthe end of 1918 the
paid employees of the Joan organizationin the New York
District alone numberedover i,00. By the time of the
Victory Loan the New York marketingorganization had
attained a technical, highly professionalcharacter; it was then
virtually an agency of thegovernment under the direction
of the Governor of the NewYork Federal Reserve Bank.
The development in other sectionsof the country was similar
to that in New York, a developmentfrom a loosely knit,
primarily voluntary organizationto one of compact profes-
sionalism. This change reflectsthe greater efficiency of the
latter system, and the risingmagnitude of the task.
In the presentwar the largest proportion of funds bor-
rowed by thegovernment has thus far been obtained by direct
borrowing from the banks,though sales to the publicthrough
the commercial banksare again an importantmeans of
financing. In addition, therehave been sales ofgovernment
obligations throughpost offices or booths setup in public
places, through radio andother entertainers, throughnews-
papers, Federal Reserve Banks andpayroll savings plans.
The method of payrolldeductions constitutesone of the
4important innovations of the present borrowingprogram,
and its extensive use has placed employers ina position of
relatively greater importance than formerly in the schemeo
war finance. A considerable degree of pressure to subscribe
is now applied to individuals as members of employeegroups,
while previously the sales pressurewas directed more largely
toward separate individuals than toward groups.
Direct Lending to the Government by Banks
The principal contrast as regards the role of the banks in
this war and the last is the growth in the direct purchase of
government securities by commercial banks. It is this that
Constitutes both the major contribution of banks towar
financing and the most distinctive feature of Treasury policy
in the Second World War,
The magnitude of bank investments in government secur-
ities during the two wars, as compared with total federal debt
outstanding, is indicated in Chart I. In the First World War
commercial banks were a minor, though by no means unini-
portant, lender to the government. Today they furnish a
larger total than any other source, and at times more than
all other sources combined. In the first nine months of 19.42
about 6o percent of net borrowing by the Treasury was from
commercial banks. Moreover, bank holdings, which failed in
the last war to keep pace with the increase in Treasury
borrowing, now form a rising proportion of the tots! federal
debt outstanding.
The scale of recent bank lending to the government has
been spectacular, both by itself and in comparison with the
last war. In December 1942 banks purchased government se-
curities amounting to over 5 billion dollars. During the entire
period from the middle of 1916 to the middle of ig, on
the other hand, commercial banks increased their holdings
of government securities by less than 4.4 billion dollars. Thus
in a single month of 1942 the commercial banks of this coun-
try bought considerably more government securities than
they acquired during all of the First World War. At the end
5S
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All data are for fiscal years, andare plotted as of June 30. Data on federal
debt outstanding (interest-bearingdebt, direct and guaranteed): for World
War I, From Treasury Department,8u(lejj(Jtine 1942)p. ai; for World War II, except 1943. from TreasuryDepartment, Bulletin (October 1942)
p. 22. Data on bank holdings of federal obligations:for World War I, from Fede,al Reserve Bulletin (July'9i') p. 664, covering "member banks" and
"other commercial banks"; for WorldWar IL, except 1943, from respective
Repoi ts of the Federal DepositInsurance Corporation, covering all insured
commercial banks. Both figures for 1943are estimates based on data published






916 1917 1916of June 1919 they held a total of soinethmg OVCI 5 billion,
an amount that is almost identical with purchases of govern-
ment securities by banks in December 1942. At the end of
the fiscal year 1942-43, according to present indications, they
will hold government securities in excess of 6o billion.
Government borrowing during the First World War was
based chiefly on Treasury obligations in the form of short-
term certificates of indebtedness and the longer-term bonds
and notes. The former, which constituted the bulk of the
floating debt, consisted mainly of loan certificates or tax-
anticipation certificates, issued in anticipation of income to
be obtained later from the sale of bonds or from taxation.4
The other group of obligations included long-term bonds
offered in four successive Liberty Loan issues at different
dates during 1917 and 1918, and Victory notes, having a
maturity of four years, which were offered sonic months after
the Armistice.
The sale of short-term Treasury certificates was a way of
obtaining funds in advance of the elaborately planned Lib-
erty and Victory Loan drives. One might even say that in
large measure the latter were funding operations whereby
short-term debt was converted into long-term debt. It was
expected that by selling certificates at intervals, and having
them mature at a rate to correspond to the yield of bond
sales, a fairly even flow of funds into and out of the Treasury
could be maintained. As will be seen later, this ideal adjust-
ment of certificates to bond sales was not fully achieved. The
total amount of loan certificates issued between April 1917
and May i 919 came to ibillion dollars. These securities
had maturities ranging up to five months, and for the most
part bore interest at rates of fromto 41/2 percent a year.
Because of their short maturities and satisfactory yield the
loan certificates were of a character to appeal to banks. Prior
to the Third Liberty Loan a system of quotas forthe purchase
of certificates was introduced, and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury sent a telegram to every bank and trust companyin the
country urging it to subscribe. Before the Fourth Liberty
7S
Loan campaign the banks were virtually ordered to subscribe
to certificates at a monthly rateequivalent topercent of their
gross resources. Whether the useof such strong p essure was
necessary to the success of the borrowing operations can
hardly be determined, but it seems certain that it served to
provide a wider and more even distribution of the certificates
among the banks of the country thanWOUI(l otherwise have
obtained.
The amounts of certificates outstanding at different dates,
and their relation to other types of government debt, are
shown in Chart II. It will be observed that the total of all
types of Treasury certificates outstanding reached a maxi-
mum of 6.3 billion dollars in April 1919. At the end of June
1919 almost half of all certificates outstanding were in the
portfolios of commercial banks. The peak of the national
debt was reached in August 1919. By that time the Victory
Loan campaign was successfully over, receipts from taxes had
begun to exceed receipts from instalments paid on Victory
notes, and there was no longer any need for loan certificates.
Accordingly, the Treasury announced their discontinuance.
Tax-anticipation certificates, however, continued to he used.
In addition to Treasury certificates, the banks purchased a
considerable volume of long-term bonds.
Changes in commercial bank holdings of government
obligations in relation to total federal debt are shown in the
following tabulation, in which value figures are for the end
of June and are in millions of dol1ars.It is seen from these
figures that out of an increase in federal debt of 22.5 billion
dollars between the middle of 1917 and the middle of igig,




19161917 1918 1919 1920
Bank holdings of gov-
ernment securities$753$1,545$ 3,215$ 5,143$ 3,751
Total federal debt 9722,71311,98625,23424,061
Percent of debt held
by banks 77.5%56.9%26.8%20.4%15.6%I
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While the total of government obligationsheld by banks
increased as the federal debt expanded,the volume of bank
investment in government securitieswas not greatly affected
by the dates of loan flotations.This reflects the roughlycom-
plementary character of thetwo forms of government obliga-
tion, the sale of long-term bondsto banks being accompanied
by the retirement of short-termcertificates. The relationof
short-term to long-term debt is shownin Chart II. While the
total of certificates, and thereforethe size of the floating debt.
continued to grow during theperiod of war financing, itdid
not increase as rapidlyas the funded debt. The ratio of float.
ing to total debt tendedto fluctuate, rising beforea new bond
issue and falling thereafter.
The theory of loan certificatescalls for a close coordination
between the retirement ofsuch certificates and the issueof
bonds. But in practice thetwo operations failed, fora number
of reasons, to synchronizeas closely as had been anticipated.
At the time loancertificates were issued, theamount, date
of issue and rate ofreceipts from bond issueswere uncertain-
This made it impossibleto arrange maturities ofcertificates in such a manneras to coincide with receipts frombond
sales. Moreover, whileloan certificateswere convertible into
longer-termgovernment securities as issued, banksshowed a tendency to holdon to certificates because of theirattractive- ness as earning assets. In orderto overcome this tendency the governmentundertook to force theirconversion by announcing that it wouldwithdraw deposits frombanks that failed to pay at least50 percent of their loansubscriptions in the form of certificates.This was only partiallysuccessful in hastening the retirementof certificates.
Commercial bank holdingsof governmentsecurities, both short-term and long-term,reached a peak ofmore than billion dollars in themiddle of iqig.For member banks,
government securities at thattime amountedto 17 percent of total earningassets, while loans anddiscounts amounted to 7o percent. It issignificant that inJune iqg. beforethe outbreak of war inEurope, investmentsin the form ofgovern-
10ment debt alone constituted nearly as large a proportion of
the .total earning assets of commercial banks as total loans
and discounts. At the start of the present war the banks had
invested much more heavily in government securities than
they had at the end of the earlier period of wax finance.
The start of heavy lending to the government by com-
mercial banks may be said to date from the period of deficit
financing beginning in 1931. Between June 1934 and June
1941 the federal debt increased by 21.9 billion dollars. Dur-
ing the same period commercial bank holdings of government
obligations rose by 9.1 billion, an amount representing over
41 percent of the total increase in federal debt during those
years; at the end of June 1941 banks held '9 billion out of
a total of slightly less than 55 billion dollars of government
debt. Since that time the increase in debt has been consider-
ably more rapid than before; but the banks' purchases of
government securities, while also much greater, did not, at
first, keep pace 'With the growth in total debt.
Methods of war financing in the two periods differ mark-
edly with respect to the relations between short- and long-
term borrowing. The dovetailing of short- with long-term
financing, which was so important a feature of the earlier
period, has not this time been necessary, inasmuch as long-
term borrowing has provided a more regular flow of funds
to the Treasury. Formerly the use of short-term obligations
was dictated by the irregularity of receipts from taxation and
from long-term borrowing. The latter factor has not been
significant thus far in the present war. Resort to certificates
in the present war has been influenced mainly by the lower
rates obtainable on short maturities and by the needs of
different types of lenders. The proportions of short-termdebt
to total interest-bearing government debt outstanding at the
end of June in the two war periods are as follows:
11
First World War Second World War
1917-10,1% 1940-18.1%
1918 14.2 1941 - 15.1
1919 14.4 1942-17.1
1920 11.5A considerable volume ofpresent borrowing is in theform
of War Savings Bonds. Theyare technically redeemableon
demand, and for thatreason arc sometimes referredto as
part of the short-term debt.6 Thewar savings certificatesof
the earlier war, whichwere likewise redeemable inadvance,
might perhaps be included withthe short-term debtof the
first period, and theredeemable securities of thiswar, which
consist primarily of bondsand tax notes, with theshort-term debt of thepresent period. If these variousredeemable obli-
gations are classifiedas short-term, the proportion ofshort-
term borrowing is muchgreater in this war than inthe last,
as is evident from the followingfigures, basedon end-of-June
totals:
For all classes of banks,government obligationsconstitute a growing proportion oftotal earningassets, and er contra, loans and discountsconstitute a decreasingproportion. Even before the formalstart of hostilities inthe two periodsthe relative importanceof investments,and particularlyinvest- ments in the form ofgovernment securities,was very different. Thus in June1917 governmentobligationsrepresented only 4 percent of total earningassets, while in JuneIg. ithey constituted 42percent.
While all bankshave participatedin the increasedlending to thegovernment, they havediffered withrespect to the form of lending.As would beexpected from theirposition as holders ofcorrespondent balances,the larger citybanks have, in general,concentrated onsecurities having shorter maturities, whilecountry banks, witha relatively high ratio of time deposits,have takena largerproportion of longer- term Securjtj
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First World War Second WorldWar
191710.l% 1940- 25.6% 1918 17.2 1941-24.5
1919--. 18.2 194235.9
1920..-.. 15.0Bank Lending to the Public
The banks' part in financing a war may involveconsider-
ably more than supplying the Treasury with necessaryfunds.
It ordinarily entails the financing ofenterprises engaged in
war productions and mayinclude lending to individuals in
order that they, in turn, may lend to the government.
Neither of these types of lending hasincreased in the
present war to the extent that itdid in the last war. While a
fairly substantial rise in total loans anddiscounts took place
from the middle of1939to the end of1941,the increase was
slight after our entry into the war. Despitethe great expan-
sion in production and thefar-reaching transformation of
industry that have taken place, various factorshave operated
to restrain bank lending tobusiness concerns and individuals.
Among them are the extent of lendingby government agen-
cies, heavy current disbursements bythe Treasury on govern-
ment contracts, therestriction of consumer credit and the
elimination of many lines of consumergoods production,
and the absence of a policy oflending to individuals on the
security of government bonds.
Between the outbreak of war in Europein 1914 and our
entry into the war in1917loans and discounts of natioial
banks rose by 36 percent. The totalcontinued to rise there-
after at about the same rateuntil1919,when the rate of
increase became still more rapid.A considerable proportion,
at times a majorproportions of the increase in loans by
national banks that took place between1917and1919 was
in the form of loans on thecollateral of government bonds.
Loans of this type, which werepopularized under the
slogan "Borrow and Buy,"constituted one of the distinctive
features of financial policyduring the First World War. A
customer ofa bank wasallowed to buy a government bond and
pay for it withthe proceeds of a loan securedby the bond
itself. Since the loan wasrepaid either currently or out of
a depositwhich had been accumulatedgradually, the effect
was similar to thepurchase of a bond on the instalmentplan.
13P
FEDERJL RESERVE BANKSAN!) WAR FINANCING
It has been theexperience in thiscountry and abroad that
wars produce consequences ofparticular significanceto the central bankingorganization. The magnitudeof the central bank's tasksas fiscal agent, custodianof reserves andcon troller of credit isenormously increased. Atthe same time the central bankmust accommod.,te its policiesmore closely than in peace to policiesof the Treasuryand other branches
'4
- -.
The amount of such loans by national banks isshown in
i:hart III, which also indicates their importance inrelation
to total Liberty bonds, Victory notes and certificates of indebt-
edness owned by banks. While these loanswere technically
of a private character, their effectwas to make bank credit
indirectly available to the government. Therecan be little
doubt that the action of the banks in lendingto their cus-
tomers on the security of government bondscontributJ
materially to the success of the Liberty and VictoryLoan
drives.7 On the other hand, considerabledissatisfaction was
expressed at the time and subsequently withrespect to the
operation of the policy of borrow-and-buy.Banks experienced
some difficulty with the loans, and their generaleffect was
held to be inflationary.
Total loans and discounts remainedrelatively stable in
amount during the first year of thepresent war, notwith-
standing substantial changes insome categories of loans. The
small amount of bank lendingto the public Constitutesone
of the most conspicuouscontrasts in methods of financing
this war and the last. Insteadof financing business directly,
banks have lent to thegovernment and the government has
done the financing. Thenet expansion in bank credit,while
much greater than in the lastwar, is not so much greateras
might appear from consideringonly the growth in banklend- ing to thegovernment. As war financing proceedsa consider-
able expansion in certaintypes of loans mayoccur, but the
predominance of investments ingovernment securities is assured.CHART If! - NATIONAL BANK LOANS SECURED BY FEDERAL OB-
LIGATIONS, IN COMPARISONWiTHNATIONAL BANK HOLDINGS OF
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS, 191720a
a Based on Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1917-20.
Federal obligations here relerred to consist of Liberty bonds. Victory notes
and certificates of indebtedness.
Data on bank loans secured by federal obligations: for December 1917
through March 1919, taken from actual figures; for June 1917 and September
igtg through June 1920, derived from the reported figures on government
securities held as collateral for loans, with a downward adjustment of 12
percent to allow for the fact that more than 100 perèent collateral was held
against the loans.
Data on bank holdings of federal obligations: except [or 1917 taken from
actual figures; for June and December 1917, derived by removing the banks'
holdings of prewar issues Irons theirtotal reported holdings of federal
obligations.
I
BANIS LOANS SCURED BY
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS
flBANIc HOLDINGS OF FEDERAL
UiOBLIGATIONS
IISSUING DATE OF LIBERTY
LOANS
i..1TTiLia
of the govcrnmcnt. War underscores the vital importance of
central banks,and maystrengthen their standingand prestige,
but for a time at least it drastically reduces their indepen-
dence. Moreover, the aftermath of a war is likely to bring a
host of troublesome problems for the central banks.
Federal Reserve Operations During and After the La-si IVar
The outbreak of war in 1914 preceded by a few months
the start of operations by the Federal Reserve System. Thus
the First World War provided an immediate testing. Its
success in meeting this test established it firmly in the Amer-
ican financial structure. As a result of the war experience its
accomplishments were widely recognized and it attained size,
power and prestige. But all this was a prelude to a troubled
period extending from the end of the war through the
depression of 1920-22. If the war years brought the new sys-
tem unrivaled opportunities for growth and development,
the subsequent years of readjustment provided the occasion
for extravagant attack and vituperation.
In their role as fiscal agents the Federal Reserve Banks
occupied a central position in the financial operations of tlie
last war. In each of the Reserve Districts the Governors of
the Reserve Banks headed the regional loan organization.
Reserve Banks were responsible for issuing securities and
handling funds resulting from their sale, and for sending
out the advertising matter used in the loan campaigns. Some
conception of the scale of these operations is afforded by the
estimate that during the Third Liberty Loan campaign seven
tons of material advertising the loan were mailed out daily,
including Sundays, for distribution in the Chicago Reserve
District alone. The total amount of such material allocated
to the Chicago District during that one drive was three
hundred tons. This included, for instance, one poster for
every twenty-five persons in the District. The use of posters
and similar displays probably exceeded any advertising effort
ever made before or since.8
The added services performed by the Reserve Banks in
i6
1 1
Sconnection with war financing entailed a very substantial
cost to them, and the Treasury provided no reimbursement
for this added expense. The growth in volume of Reserve
Bank business was so great, however, that these years were
by far the most prosperous in the entire history of the Reserve
System. During the present war Reserve Banks receive com-
pensation for many of the direct expenses incurred on behalf
of Treasury financing. It is worth noting that in this war,
as in the last, the Reserve Banks formulate policies relating
to fiscal agency operations on instructions from the Treasury
rather than from the Board of Governors.
At the end of June 1919 the Federal Reserve System held
government obligations amounting to 232 million dollars,
or just under i percent of the outstanding federal debt. This
was in addition to loans extended on the collateral of govern.
ment bonds. The proportion of outstanding certificates of
indebtedness held by the Reserve Banks amounted to 5.6
percent of the total outstanding on June 27, 1919.
An important division of Federal Reserve activities, and
one involving discount and open market policies1 had to do
with member bank reserves. Inasmuch as credit expansion
by the banking system was conditional upon the existence
of adequate reserves in the hands of individual banks, this
phase of the Reserve Bank operations was clearly of funda-
mental significance. The principal method whereby member
banks acquired additional reserves was through collateral
loans and recliscounts at the Federal Reseive Banks. The total
of Reserve Bank loans and discounts rose from 20 million
dollars just prior to our entrance into the war to 2,200 million
in November 1919.
The discount policy of the Federal Reserve was strongly
influenced by consideration of government financing. At the
very start of the Liberty Loan program the New York Federal
Reserve Bank established a lower rate on loans secured by
Liberty bonds than on other types of loans; and a differential
in favor of such loans was maintained, except for a short
interval at the start of iqo, until the middle of 1921. Dis-
17S
count rates, moreover, were set below the level of rates pre-
vailing in the market, the rate on loans secured by Liberty
bonds and Victory notes being below the couponrates, and
the rate on commercial paper being below the marketrate
for such paper. This action was defendedon the ground that
the abnormal conditions existing in time ofwar and the
Treasury's policy of borrowing at low rates madeany other
course, in the words of Reserve authorities, "impracticable."
The most important feature of Federal Reservefinancing
during and after the lastwar consisted of granting loans to
member banks on the collateral of federal obligations.These
reached a peak of nearly2billion dollars in Mayigij; at
that time they representedover91percent of all Federal
Reserve loans and discounts. The Reserve Bankcredit made
available in this way helped to providea substantial portion
of the reserves upon which the growthof deposit creditwas
based. Open market operations,on the other hand, were of
relatively small proportions, consistingof purchases amount-
ing in all to only aboutoo million dollars.
In order to increase the abilityof the Reserve Systemto
meet the demands made upon it,steps were early taken to
concentrate legal reserve money in the hands ofthe Reserve
Banks. Patriotic appealswere addressed to member banks
and others to induce themto turn in gold. Where formerly
a considerable proportion of requiredreserves could be held
in the form of vault cash,member bank reserve requirements
were changed in 1917 to provide thatall legal reservesmust
be in the form of depositswith the Reserve Banks. Thepur-
pose of this change was primarilyto compel them to transfer
gold to the Reserve Banks.The proportion ofmonetary stocks
of gold held in the ReserveBanks rose from13percent at
the beginning of January1915 to26percent two years later,
and reached 68percent at the beginning ofigig and 7
percent at the beginning of1920.
The ability of the FederalReserve System tomeet banks' demands foraccommodation was partly theresult of the
success of the new central bankingorganization in assuming
i8a dominant positionwith respect to basic goki reserves. Upon
the entry of the United States into the war the movementof
gold, which had beeii heavily in the direction of theUnited
States, began to turn outward. Soon afterward the exportof
gold was forbidden except under license. Control overforeign
exchange was considered necessary in order to prevent an
outflow of gold from interfering with the policy ofcredit
expansion. The task of administering the licensing ofgold for
export was placed in the hands of the ReserveBanks.
The task of accommodating the financial structureof the
country to the exigencies of wartime needs was notconfined
to the Federal Reserve System. Aconsiderable degree of
voluntary control was exercised over the New York money
market by the financial community itself. The MoneySub-
committee, created as part of the Liberty Loanorganization,
also undertook to assist in maintaining orderlyconditions in
the market.° At its first meeting in September 1917this com-
mittee decided to make arrangements with a largenumber
of banks and trust companies to accumulatefunds for use
by the committee in preventing the governmentborrowing
operations from forcing rates up too far. By thefirst of
October 200 million dollars was available for thecommittee
to administer at its discretion.The committee functioned as
expected until the second half of 1918, and wasgiven a large
share of the credit for maintainingshort-term rates at levels
of 6 percent or below. Governor Stronglater declared that
the work of tile committee, by protectingthe market for
securities generally, was of great help in assuring asatisfactory
market for government obligations. By August1918 market
sentiment had begun to alter, and support was nolonger
required.
Immediately after the Armistice a slight recessionin indus-
trial production set in, and this lasteduntil early in 1919.
From March onward a speculativesituation developed which
grew steadily morepronounced. In January 1920 the New
York Federal Reserve Bank raised itsrediscount rate from
4,4 to 6 percent, and fourmonths later to 7 percent, where
19it remained for a year. Opposition to restrictive measures
of this sort was, of course, to be expected; it was rendered
especially violent by the sharp deflation of agricultural and
general commodity prices beginning in May1920.The chorus
of denunciation was led by the agricultural groups, who
blamed the Federal Reserve for the recession of farm prices
from their inflated postwar level. The president of the Amer-
ican Cotton Association demanded that "the Federal Reserve
Board and Wall Street divorce relations and give us a finan-
cial machinery that will function for tile business of the
people of the country and not for any vested wealth," and
he went so far as to predict a repetition of Andrew Jackson's
bank war.
The critics pointed to tile large profits realized by Reserve
Banks as proof that discount rates were excessive. Some
bankers also joined the opposition, declaring that high dis-
count rates either denied banks the services of tile Federal
Reserve System or forced them to charge their customers
usurious rates. Inasmuch as the purpose of the high discount
rate policy was to curb credit expansiG;;, criticism shows
a strange lack of understanding of tile methods and motives
of central bank procedure. Nevertheless, Governor Strong
felt himself on the defensive and declared he was "mortified"
that earnings were so high, adding that "we do not want
those earnings." He explained the high profits on the basis
of the large volume of business transacted rather than the
high rates imposed.
The Federal Reserve was, in effect, caught ina cross-fire of
criticism. On the one hand it was attacked for having main-
tained too liberal a policy during and immediately after the
war, and of having thereby contributed to inflation. On the
other hand it was accused, particularly by the agricultural
groups, of having brought about the postwar collapse in
commodity prices by raising its rates too high. In answering
critics of Federal Reserve policy Governor Strong minimized
the possible effectiveness of high discountrates as a means of
checking inflation. He argued that prices, certainly in the
20early days of the war, "advanced n response to competitive
bidding which could not be controlled. ..and the Federal
Reserve System was a bystander. . . of that proceeding." The
credit expansion that took place during the war he character-
ized as "inevitable, unescapable, ... necessary,and.. . defens-
ible." He further declared that "had we endeavored toforce
economy - economy of credit and economyin consumption
of goods - upon the people of the United States by discount
rates, we would have been inviting disaster."
In defending the Reserve System against the chargeof
having pursued a deliberate deflationary policy. Governor
Strong quoted from the Federal Reserve Bulletinof March
1920,shortly before the onset of the postwar depression:
"The expansion of credit set in motion by the war mustbe
checked ... Deflation,however, merely for the sake of deflation
and a speedy return to 'normal' - deflation merelyfor the sal'e
of restoring security values and commodityprices to their prewar
levels without regard to other consequences,would be an insen-
sate proceeding in the existing postureof national and world
affairs."
Governor Strong again reverted to the ideathat the Federal
Reserve had been powerless towithstand economic tenden-
cies. In this instance he declared that:
"Irrespective of any policy that might have beenadopted by any
particular bank or system of banks -.. what hashappened was
bound to happen anyway. This great waveof expansion of prices
had reached its climax and it was bound tobreak."
The final report of the CongressionalCommittee which
investigated the financial record of the warand postwar
period, notwithstanding its rathermeasured comments, sup-
ported the view that the credit policies ofthe Federal Reserve
left much to be desired. Thecommittee concluded that dis-
count policy had been toogreatly subordinated to the wishes
of the Treasury, and particularly tothe desire of the Treasury
for easy money. It was suggestedthat the advantage of low
rates thus made possible ongovernment borrowing was more
than offset by the resultant highprices.
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The Coniinittee maintained thatan earlier resort to firmly
restrictive measures would have diminishedthe difiicultjes
of 1920-21, which they regardedas the culmination of "a
period of expansion,extravagance, and speculation, the like
of which has never before beenseen in this country orper.
haps in the world." By thetime restriction was seriously
begun, the inflationaryprocess had gone too far to be brought
safely under control. Finally,the Committee characterizedas
inexcusable the failure of the ReserveSystem to ease discount
rates earlier than it did after theonset of the recessionn 1920.10
Federal Reseive Operations inthe l'resent liar
capstone of the country's bankingorganization the
Federal Reserve System hashad a central partto play in the
financial program of thepresent war. The Open Market
Committee has been calledupon for advice and consultation,
and the various regionalloan committees have beenplaced
under the direction ofReserve Bank presidents. Themechan-
ical operations of distributingTreasury obligations havebeen
conducted by the FederalReserve Banks, activitiesthat entail
a great amount of additional work.Reserve Banks have been
compelled to add entiredivisions to theirorganization, the increase in personnel amountingin sozne instancesto as much as 50 or 6opercent within a period ofa few months.
Besides the added workgrowing out of the issueand redemp- tion of Treasuryobligations, operationshave expandedon account of the increased volumeof paymentsto and from the Treasury. All ofthis parallels fairly closelythe experience of the Federal ReserveSystem in the lastwar.
A new but importantphase of the activitiesof the Federal Reserve Banksas fiscal agencies for thegovernment has to do with the administrationof creditguarantees The War and Navy Departmentsand the MaritimeCommission have agreed to guaranteeloan contractsentered into inconnec- tion withwar production. Whilegeneral ruleswere laid clown, the FederalReserve Banks havebeen given therespon.
22sibility, subject to approval by the guaranteeing agencies, for
arranging loans and such guarantees as may be suitable to
the circumstances. The broadening scope of the Reserve
Banks' activities is shown by the fact that they have been
instructed to deal with commercial banks regardless of
whether the latter are members of the Federal Reserve System.
The Reserve Banks have also engaged in operations of a
more typically central bank character. It is to benoted that
the position of the Federal Reserve System, in relation to its
own and member bank reserves, isconsiderably altered from
what it was during the last war. This is largely because, in
addition to the lessons of a quarter century of varied experi-
ence, it possesses powers and resourcesfar greater than it had
at that time. The most important of its newerinstruments
of central bank policy is the authority to change the reserve
requirements of member banks. A change in the volume of
free reserves can now be brought about, withinthe limits
imposed by the law, merely through the issuance of an order
by the Federal Reserve Board announcing a changein the
legal reserve requirements. Unfortunately this newand
powerful instrument of control has thus far provedsomewhat
unwieldy in its operation. Reserve authorities continue to
rely mainly upon the more flexible instrumentof open market
operations.
In the middle of 1942 the Reserve authoritiesbegan to
make reserves available in substantial amounts.The need for
reserves was the result of twoprincipal factors, the increased
volume of currency in circulation andthe expansion of
deposits consequent upon heavy buying of government secur-
ities by banks. Since the reserve stringency waslocal to New
York and Chicago, rather thangeneral, the action with
respect to reserves was directedprimarily toward these cen-
ters. One of the first steps was toreduce reserve requirements
for central reserve city banks bysuccessive stages, while leav-
ing them unchanged for otherclassifications of banks. This
action was made possible by anamendment to the Federal
Reserve Act which was approvedin July 1942. The Fed-
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era! Reserve Banks thereafter provided additional reserves
through open market operations, principally in the New York
market.
At about the same time the Reserve authorities modified
the regulations governing the granting of loans by member
banks at times when reserves are temporarily deficient. The
effect of the change was to make it possible to utilize bank
reserves more fully than before. It served to remove still
another obstacle to the extension of bank credit.
Open market purchases by the Federal Reserve System
have been dictated by the twofoldpurpose of increasing
reserves and supporting the price o government securities.
In pursuit of the latter objective, the policywas adopted of
maintaining the pattern of rates existingon government
obligations: the Federal Reserve undertook to make what-
ever purchases were necessary to accomplishthis end." In
the autumn of 1942 the Reserve Banks,as a result of the
unexpectedly cool reception given a large Treasuryopera-
tion, bought a billion and a quarter ofgovernment securities
in a little over six weeks. At about thesame time discount
rates were cut in order to encourage the use of Reserve credit
by member banks, andsoon afterward the president of the
New York Federal Reserve Bank promised themember banks
of his District that "banks wilt be provided withreserves,
by one means or another,as additional reserves arc needed."
Thus the Reserve Banks have resortedto a variety of tech-
niques - changes in reserve requirements,open market oper-
ations, and discount policy- to meet the needs arising out
of war financing.
An important extension of the principle ofsupporting the
market for governnient obligationswas introduced at the
end of April 1942. Althoughpreferential rates had been
employed before, their introduction forthe present purpose
was described by the Reserve authoritiesas "a new instru-
ment of central bank policy." It consisted ofan undertaking
on the part of the Reserve Banks to purchase,at a price to
yield /8 percent per annum, all Treasurybills offered. By a
24later modification the Federal Reserve Banks agreed to resell
as well as buy Treasury bills at a price to yieldperccnt.
The purpose of this action was to facilitate to the fullest pos-
sible extent the purchase of government securities by banks.
Its effect was to make bills as good a source of liquid funds
for commercial banks as cash itself. It is of great importance
in broadening the market for short-term government secur-
ities and in contributing to the liquidity of the entire com-
mercial banking structure.
So far as questions of war financing are concerned, the most
important change that has taken place in the Federal Reserve
System since the last war is the tremendous increase in its
resources. During the previous war, as was mentioned earlier,
reserves were so limited that special steps were taken to insure
their adequacy. A point was reached after the war when vari-
ous of the Reserve Banks were able to satisfy the legal require-
ment only by extensive borrowing of reserves from other
Reserve Banks. The possibility of such a reserve stringency
arising in the present war is so remote as to appear completely
out of the question. The reason for the extreme ease in the
reserve position of the Reserve Banks lies primarily in the
heavy flow of gold to this country from igto 1940.
At the time the United States entered the war in 1917,
reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks amounted to slightly
less than i billion dollars, and they rose to a peak of 2.2
billion in 1920. Despite this increase the expansion of deposits
and the increase of currency in circulation during the war and
immediately afterward placed a continuing strain upon
reserves. While reserves were always legally adequate for the
Federal Reserve System as a whole, the margin of excess was
never very great, ranging from 200 to 800 million. At the
end of 1941, on the other hand, reserves totaled 20.8 billion
dollars, as compared with minimum requirements of approi-
mately 8.4 billion.
These changes in the powers and reserve position of the
Reserve Banks have great significance in the present war
emergency. They make it reasonably certain that the Reserve
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System can quickly and easily satisfy any demand for credit
that is likely to bc imposed upon it. It can do this without
any need to alter the law, and therefore without the shock
to public confidence that might result if it were to depart
from its traditional rules. The Federal Reserve Systemhas
been given the dual task, first, of providing thereserve basis
for the greatest banking operation of history, andsecond,
of stabilizing the market forgovernment securities at a time
when the outstanding debt has grown to proportionsnever
before approached in any country in the world. It issignifi-
cant that along with the growth of the Reserve System's
responsibilities has gone a growth initsstrength and
resources.
The powers of Reserve authoritiesare clearly adequate,
even apart from any possible change in the Jaw,to provide
for the prospective expansion of bank creditarising out of
war financing. It is to be hoped that theirpower and skill
will prove equal also to the problemsthat arise when the
immediate emergency is past. One of themost pointed lessons
that emerges from the experience ofthe First World War is
that the end of war doesnot signify the end of central bank-
ing problems. Indeed, themost perplexing problems of that
entire period were those thatarose after the war was over.
Not the least part of the addedstrength of the Federal Reserve
System today lies in the fact that ithas the experience of those
difficult years to drawupon.
TREASURY I'OLlCy IN TIMEOF %'AR
The amount collected fromtaxation in the presentwar
is considerably inexcess of what it was during the First
World War. But federalexpenditure has likewise risen
greatly, with the result that theprPportion of tax revenue to
total expenditure isvery close to what it was at that time.
Charts IV and Vpresent a comparison of the distinctive
features of Treasury financingin the twowars. It is worth




I1938-39 it absorbed almostseven times this proportion. At
the peak of spending in the lastwar, expenditure was nearly
percent of national income; in the fiscalyear 1942-43 it is
expected to be about 66 percent. In 1918-19,the year of
heaviest spending in the lastwar, receipts from taxes
amounted to about 25 percent of totalexpenditure, a rate
slightly below expectations for thepresent fiscal year. Total
taxes are today taking a much larger share of nationalmoney
income than in the last war; and personal incometaxes con-
stitute a larger proportion and taxeson corporations a smaller
proportion of total taxes than before.
One of the agreeable surprises in connection withthe
Revenue Act for 19 17-18 was the greatexcess of tax yield over
expectations. Where calculations called forbillion dollars
the amount realized was.7 billion; the excess profit tax,
which was the most important singlesource of tax revenue,
was expected to produce 1.2 billion and instead brought in
1.8 billion. On apparently arbitrary grounds itwas decided
that one-third of expenditure should be covered by income
from taxes, and the wartime revenue billswere fonnulated
with this approx/mate ratio in mind.
As compared with the First World War, Treasury policy
in the present war has been characterized by heavier taxation
of the high income groups and relatively greater borrowing
from the lower income groups of the population. Rates of
taxation on individual and corporate income andon profits
have been pushed to new heights. It is worth noting that
taxation and borrowing from the public are to some extent
mutually exclusive methods of obtaining funds. The heavy
taxation of higher income groups in recent years has made
it more difficult to obtain funds from these groups by bor-
rowing. Exemption levels have been drastically reduced, but
the amount collected from lower income groups is corn par-
atively small. War Savings Bonds, introduced to tap incomes
in the lower and middle brackets, represent an important
fiscal device. Despite their moderate success, however, they
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-CHART V - SOURCES OF FEDERAL EXPENDITUREAND OF TAX






WORLD WAR WORLD WAR H








SOURCES OF TAX REVENUE
/// ,//__/,,










asee p. so, footnote to Chart IV. In the Annual Reports of the Secretaty of
the Treasury a breakdown of the figures on internal revenue (individual and
corporation income taxes and excess profit taxes) is given for1915-16 (p. 32)
and for1916-17 (p. 56),but not for1917-18and1918-19.For the two latter
years the constituent figures have been estimated by using the same propor-
tions as reported for the calendar years 1917 and 1918 in theStatisticsof
Income, 1919, p. 36; excess profit taxes paid by individuals on 1918 income
were not given separately in that source, however, and therefore have been
included with the total for individual returns. For 1940-43 figures on the vari
ous revenue items are presented in the sourccited in the footnote to Chart IV.
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able income to the supply of availableconsumer goods, that
is, in closing the "inflationary gap," which has been the
professed goal of Treasury policy.
Judging from the experience of other countries wherea
much larger share of national money income is taken intaxes,
it would seem that still heavier taxation is likelyto be
attempted. Nevertheless, chief reliance will probablycon-
tinue to be placed on borrowing. For thisreason, and because
borrowing is of especial concern to banks, it is appropriate
to devote particular attention to this phase of Treasury policy.
Borrowing Methods and Loan Provisions
Perhaps the most conspicuous contrast in Treasury finan-
cing in the two worldwars has to do with the method of
borrowing. In the earlier period,as we have seen, reliance
was placed upon a few short, intensive drives characterize(l
by high-pressure sales methods and degrees of compulsion
which in some cases approached outright intimidation.Bond
sales in the present war have been almost continuous,with
War Savings Bonds available ona current basis and so-called
"tap" issues offered at frequent intervals. Various devices
have been adopted for attracting subscriptions, but individual
compulsion has been applied rather sparingly.
In view of the somewhat disappointing results ofsales to
Footnote to Chari B'
All data are for fiscal years, and arc plottedas of June 30. Data on national
income: 1914-29, two-year moving averages of NationalBureau estimates;
1930-43, Department of Commerce estimates. Data on federal expenditureand
sources of revenue: 1914, 1915, 1921-38, from Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury for the fiscal year ended June30, 19.11, pp. 41.f-16; 1916-20
and 1939-41, from the Aninial Reports for therespective years; 1942, front
Treasury Department. Bulletin (July 1912)p- 68;1943, from estimates an-
nounced in Federal Reserve Bulletin (Novemnlici 1942)pp. io68II. Federal
expenditures for 1937 and 1938 are augmented by"net appropriations to
federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund" inoider to make data
comparable with those for other years; foramounts see Annual Report of time
Secretary of the Treasury for 19.11,P' 42.1. In the earlier years expenditures
were not always equal to receipts as reported by the'Freaslln-Atljustnsents
have been made to allow for such discrepancies.
30the general public in the first year of the presentwar, it is
worth recalling that persons familiar with the methods used
in the First World War were convinced that those methìods
were effective in achieving their aim of selling securities.
A former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, R. C:. Lefhng-
well, had this to say of the measures employed at that dine:
"No one in America was ever allowed to forget that there was a
war, that he had a part in it, that that part included buying Lib-
erty bonds or Victory notes, and that to do so he must save money.
In the history of finance no device was ever evolved so ellectise
for procuring saving as the Liberty loan campaigns. Everyone was
always buying a Liberty bond or Victory note, or trying to pay
for one, or getting read)' to buy bonds or notes of the next issue.
The loan campaigns stand out in iiiy mind as the mtst nhagiiili-
cent economic achievement of any people.''
Moreover, early in the present war Canada adopted a hybrid
policy which makes use of well organized drives while retain-
ing Continuous sales for those best served by that means.
These considerations presumably explain the changes in
borrowing methods introduced in December 1942, changes
that went a long way toward meeting the objections raised
against borrowing methods in force up to that time. Sales of
non-marketable War Savings Bonds continue to be on a cur-
rent basis, but special offerings of government securities,
with terms designed to meet the needs of different classes of
borrowers, are to be made at fairly frequent intervals. Bonds
intended chiefly for institutional investors are ineligible for
purchase by commercial banks until io years after issue. The
Treasury has indicated, moreover, that it will time its offer-
ings and arrange for payment in a manner to impose a mini-
mum of strain on the market. Active selling campaigns arc
to be conducted in order to stimulate purchases of the differ-
ent types of securities. Finally, the earlier opposition to the
public's borrowing from commercial banks has been with-
drawn in the case of short-termamortized loans on market-
able government securities. This is a modest first step toward
the borrow-and-buy policy followed in the last war.
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'l'he extent of public participationin loans during the
First World War is indicated by tileaccompanying figures
showing the approximate number ofsubscribers to the van-
Otis issues. Methods ol I)ori-owiiig usedso far in tile present
war have been so different from those employed inthe last
war that it is not possible to present conlj)arablefigures for
the public's participation incurrent lending to the govern-
ment. Information is available, however,to show tile number
of individuals subscribingto War Savings Bonds by regular
payroll deductions. In November1942 it was reported that
23,000,000 workers were investing anaverage ol 8 pCl(ent of
their wages in thismanner.
FirsL Liberty Loan 4,000,000
Second Liberty Loan 9,400,000
Third Liberty Loan 18,300,000
Fourth Liberty Loan 22.800,000
Victory Loan 11,800,000
Greater use of highpressure methods in tile First World
War was perhaps called for bydifferences ill circumstances
existing at that time. Tilepublic today knows a great deal
more about government bonds than it didthen. It under-
stands why tile governmentmust borrow, and it has a better
acquaintance with methods of lendingto the government.
(:ollseqtlentl)' there is considerablyless need to educate the
public on these points. Thepeople, moreover,are more
homogeneous than before, andmore solidly united behind
the war effort. But although thetask of selling securities to
the public is in somerespects simpler than it was in 19 17-18,
tile question has frequently been raisedwhether more would
not be accomplished by a selling campaignmaking still
greater use of the energetic methods of theearlier program.
Provisions attaching to new Treasury issuesalso show many
contrasts with those employed during the lastwar. Tax ex-
einption is conspicuously absent.War Savings Bonds have
been made non-negotiable, and otherissues have had their
negotiability greatly restricted. Couponrates on Treasury
obligations are much lower than in thelast war, anda still
32more striking contrastthey have been maintained at an
approximately constant level. The problem of converting
bonds bearing a low rate into new issues bearing a higher
rate, which proved so troublesome in the last war, has not
arisen thus far in the present war.
War Savings Bonds carry maturities ot 10 ori 2 years.
Since the Treasury agrees to redeem these securities on de-
mand, though at somewhat less favorable terms, they are
technically demand obligations. Nevertheless it seems best.
despite this technicality, to regard them as medium-term
rather than as short-term debt. Of the total of billion
dollars borrowed by the United States in the first ten months
of 1942, 50 percent represented securities having maturities
of under 5 years, 35 percent from 5 to io years, and 15 per-
cent over mo years. In the first ten months ofiqi8, on the
other hand, a total of 11.3 billion dollars was borrowed; 'i
percent consisted of securities with maturities ofyears and
under, the remainder having maturities of over io years.
It was noted earlier that during the FirstWorld War
Treasury borrowing was based chiefly on long-termbonds
and short-term certificates of indebtedness. TheVictory Loan
consisted of notes running from three to four years.'While
the rates paid on these different obligations, mostof them
from.5 to 4.75 percent, seemhigh by present standards,
they were regarded at the time as remarkablylow. It was
repeatedly stated, on high official authority, thatonly the
influence of patriotism allowed such low rates tobe main-
tained. The yield on highest grade corporateissues at the
time was somewhat abovepercent.
From the start the Treasury made it the cornerstoneof its
policy to hold down the interest rate on governmentobliga-
lions. It was argued that adoption of alow rate on the first
issue would advertise the soundnessof the government's
credit and would facilitate subsequentborrowing. It seems
more likely that it hadthe opposite effect. Because of their
relatively low coupon rate the bondsof this issue almost at




that I uture issues would haveto hear a higher coupon. Sub-
scribers to earlier loanswere allowed to convert to the later
issues carrying higher yields.Conversion rights proved, how-
ever, to be a continuingsource of confusion; this wasone
of the annoyingconsequences of following a somewhatoppor-
tunistic policy as regards theternis of borrowing.
Treasury policy withrespect to tax provisions attachedto
the various issues followedan erratic and inconsistentcourse.
Because of their relativelylow rates, bonds issued duringthe First Liberty Loanwere made wholly tax-exempt. Taxex-
emption was somewhat limitedin the Second Liberty Loan,
and surtax exemptionwas removed in the Third. In the
Fourth Loan intereston bofl(lS of a face valueup to $'o,00O
was exempted from thesurtax and the excess profittax until
two years after the end of thewar, and certain exemptions
were allowed to holders of bondsof the Second and Third
Liberty Loans. In the VictoryLoan, notes bearing3.75 per-
cent were made whollyexempt, and those bearing4.75 per- cent were made Partiallyexempt, the former being designed
for investors of largeand the latter for investorsof small
means. Certificates of indebtednesswere exempted from stir-
taxes and excess profittaxes to a principalsum of $5,000.
The extensiveuse of tax exemption is partlyto be ex-
plained by the fact thatthe Liberty and VictoryLoan pro- grams as a whole placed chiefemphasis upon investors in
the higher incomegroups. But even granting thattax exemp-
tion made it possibleto borrow at a lowerrate than otherwise
would have been feasible,its economic wisdomremains in question. It is worthobserving that thetax-exemption pro- visions were introducedover the protests ofmany bankers
and economists, thatthey came into increasingdisrepute as the years passed, andthat they areconspicuously absent in
Treasury financing ofthe Second WorldWar.
Support of 1/se GovernmentBond Market
One of the troublesomeproblems confronting theTreas- ury during the last warwas the constant tendencyfor bonds
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-- -to fall below par in the market. Various expedients were
resorted to in order to support the price of bonds, but they
met with scant success. The most direct attempt to support
the price of outstanding issues was included in the Third
Liberty Loan Act, which authorized the War Finance Cor-
poration to buy Liberty bonds, other than those of the first
issue, with a view to supporting their market price. The
exception was based on the fact that, with the rising scale
of taxation, the fully exempt issues of the first loan had risen
to par. The Act provided thatpercent of the proceeds of
new bond sales should be made available as a Bond Purchase
Fund. Purchases began early in i 918 and continued until
the middle of 1920, when a permanent sinking fund plan
was put into effect. The period of greatest activity wasduring
the Third and Fourth Liberty Loan campaigns. In the eight
months ending with November 1918 the War Finance Cor-
poration bought government bonds to the amount of 378
million dollars, of which nearly two-thirds was resold to the
Bond Purchase Fund. But despite these operations govern-
ment bonds other than those fully exempt continued to sell
below par.
The tax-exempt feature was largely a price-supporting
measure. Since its effectiveness was proportional to tax rates,
the Treasury asked for a heavy increase in rates in igi8,
advancing the argument that this would serve to maintain
the price of tax-exempt government bonds. Other provisions,
such as those giving favorable rates at the Federal Reserve
Banks to borrowing secured by bonds, were likewise expected
to stTengthen the market value of governmentsecurities, but
they were attended by very indifferent success.
The Treasury was greatly concerned throughout the war
to prevent a depreciation in the marketvalue of outstanding
obligations. At one time the Secretary of the Treasuryraised
the question of the desirability of suspending freedealings
in government bonds, but nothing came of thesuggestion.'4
After the conclusion of war financing, andpartly perhaps
because of the retirement of Secretary McAdoo,who had
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made this his particularconcern, the question of maintain-
ing the market value ofgovernment bonds gradually sank
into the background. The prices ofgovernment bonds de-
clined during the second half of1919, and fell sharply in
1920. By that time government supportwas no longer of
appreciable significance. For all butone of the issues the
lowest monthly quotations, ranging from81.70 to 94.82, were
reached in May igo; the exceptionwas bonds of the First
Liberty Loan, which reached theirlow point, 86.30, in July
1921. This differencc in behavior isa reflection of the change
in the tax situation, which diminishedthe value of the full
exemption enjoyed by this particular issue.
The tendency during the lastwar to rely UpOn indirect
and partial measures for themaintenance of security prices
contrasts sharply with the situation prevailingtoday. Since
1937 the Federal Reserve System has undertakento prevent
any decline in the price ofgovernment issues from reaching
panic proportions. Open marketoperations of the Federal
Reserve System, whichwere formerly employed to help regu-
late the volume of member bankreserves and thereby facili-
tate the control of credit, havecome to serve the dual pur-
pose of providing additional reserves and stabilizingthe price
of government bonds.
The powers of the FederalReserve to support the price
of government securities inthis way arc very great. Tile
abundance of the reservesassures the banks' ability to expand
reserve credit, with which to pay for bondpurchases, to the
extent of many billions of dollars. Monetaryand fiscal powers
in the hands of the Treasurycould be used to extend this
limit still further: Not only isit possible, therefore, for the
Federal Reserve to buygovernment securitiesin large
amount, bitt it is to be expected that thenormal working of
the loan program will leadto their doing so. As longas
Treasury borrowing fromcommercial banks continues-as..
sliming that the demand forcurrency is maintaincd_addj
tional member bankreserves will be required. To theextent
that these are provided byFederal Reserve purchasesofgovernment securities in the open market, the functioning
of the central bank in supplying the additional reserveswill
give support to the government security market. -Byusing
open market purchasesin conjunction with changes in re
serve requirements theFederal Reserve can provide much
or little support.Whether the support thus provided will be
greater or less than is neededvil1 depend upon many factors.
Moreover, the entire policy of attempting tocontrol interest
rates in this manner maybe challenged. Nevertheless, the
existence of this market-supporting mechanismis a highly
significant factor in the present financial situation.
Open market purchases during the last war were on arela-
tively minor scale. A number of considerationshelp to ex-
plain why strong support for governmentsecurities was not
made effective in this way. In the firstplace, Reserve author-
ities were less familiar with openmarket operations than
with the discount rate as an instrumentof central bank pol-
icy. Moreover, reserves of theFederal Reserve Banks avail-
able for making purchases inthe open market were never
very great. At the sametime, member banks did not require
additional reserves to the extent thatmight ordinarily have
been expected: the lower reserverequirements provided
under the Federal Reserve Acthad freed considerable
amounts of reserves for useby member banks, and imports
of gold from abroad hadbrought about an expansion in
basic reserve money. In addition,banks were exempted from
the necessity of holding reservesagainst government deposits;
this meant that creation oflarge amounts of government
deposits imposed relativelylittle burden upon existing re-
serve balances.15 Evenwhen additional reserves wereneeded
by member banks they wereusually obtained by loans se-
cured by government obligationsrather than by Reserve
Bank purchases of securitiesin the open market. It is true,
of course, that if greater usehad been made of open market
purchases the need forrediscounting would have been cor-
respondingly less.
The foregoing analysis suggeststhat effective support of
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Sthe price of government securities is considerably more feas-
ible in this war than it was in the last. The evidence of the
former period with respect to the recurrent tendency for
government securities to depreciate cannot be accepted as
conclusive in present circumstances. Furthermore, both the
delicacy and the magnitude of Federal Reserve operations
are increased by the growth in the total amount of govern-
ment securities. But so, also, is the need to avoid, if at all
possible, a material decline in their market value.
Control of the Flow of Funds
The banking mechanism helps to cushion the effects of
the government's financial operations, and atno time is the
need for such a service more apparent than in time ofwar.
The magnitude of Treasury operations, the scale ofpayments
flowing to the government in connection with taxation and
borrowing, and the volume of Treasury disbursementsare
far beyond those of peacetime. The movement of funds into
and out of the market is unavoidably irregular. Leftto diem-
selves these operations would have a seriously disruptive
influence, with consequences that might impede the func-
tioning of the war economy. A variety of techniques exists
for preventing Treasury operations from unduly disturbing
the money market; all have this incommon, that they tend
to provide a movement of funds opposite to that of the
Treasury operations.
During the last war the use of short-term Treasurycerti-
ficates, even though they were byno means perfectly synchro-
nized with bond sales, equalized toa considerable extent the
effects of irregular receipts from taxes and loans. Ofgreater
importance, the Treasury made use of the depositorysystem,
which had existed much earlier;a considerable proportion
of Treasury funds were distributed in differentbanks, to a
total of nearly io,00o, scattered throughout thecountry.
What happened was that banks boughtgovernment obliga-
tions by placing deposit credits at the disposalof the Treas-
ury. The deposit credits were then left untouched until the
38Treasury had need for them in making disbursements. This
helped to avoid the drain tiLat would have resulted if the
greatly expanded balances of the Treasury had been concen-
trated in one place. Since banks were not required to hold
reserves against government deposits, the expansion in the
amount of these deposits imposed no corresponding strin-
gency upon the banks. If funds were not otherwiseavailable
with which to meet demands made upon the banks when the
government drew down its deposits, the banks wereable to
obtain the necessary sunis by borrowing from the Federal
Reserve on the basis of government obligations intheir port-
folios. In general, it may be said that the action of the coun-
try's banks, and of the Treasury and Federal Reserve System
in conjunction with the banks, served to offsetfairly success-
fully the irregular flow of funds to and from theTreasury.
A related problem arises with respect to the flow offunds
into or out of private use. Capital movements in theUnited
States, as in all other belligerent countries,have come to be
almost completely regulated. The importanceof such pol-
icies to commercial banks scarcely needs to beemphasized.
Since banks constitute the most important segmentof the
country's financial organization and are thecustodians of a
large share of available resources, measuresthat interfere
with the flow of capital are of major concern tothem. Such
measures, apart from theirimmediate effects, are significant
for the permanent impress they may leave uponthe country's
banking institutions.
In the First World War twoorganizations were set up to
direct the flow of capital funds, the WarFinance Corpora-
tion to facilitate borrowing byenterprises necessary to the
war effort, and the CapitalIssues Committee to restrict secur-
ity flotation not vital to the war. Duringthe war period the
former dispensed a sum amounting to306 million dollars,
and the latter allowed the issue ofsecurities amounting to
2.9 billion. The CapitalIssues Committee restrictedsecurity
flotation not only by rejectingapplications but also by the
fact that borrowing operationswhich otherwise might have
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been undertaken were discouraged by the knowledge that
they would have to be submitted to the Committee.
The Treasury is again making extensive use of depository
banks in financing the present war. All incorporated banks
and trust companies have been urged to qualify for the de-
posit of public funds. They are then permitted topay foi-
their own and their customers' subscriptions by crediting tile
deposit account of the Treasury on theirown books.'6 De-
posits are drawn upon only as needed. In contrast with the
practice in the last war, reserves arenow required against
these deposits, and in addition theyare subject to the same
insurance assessment as any other deposits. Whetherthese
requirements will he maintained remains to beseen.
The machinery that exists today for influencing theflow
of funds is vastly more extensive and complex than itwas in
the First World War. The Securities and ExchangeCommis-
sion and quite a number of othercomparable institutions
were unknown a decade ago. The organizationmost closely
resembling the War Finance Corporation is theReconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation which, indeed,came into being as
a resurrection of the earlier institution. Thisorganization
has the power and theresources to operate on a scale far
exceeding that of its forerunner, and ithas in addition a
record of several years' experience indoing so. Moreover,
numerous subsidiaries have been establishedto carry its activ-
ities into different fields.
In addition to themany institutions with power to influ-
ence capital transactions, therewas inaugurated, in April
1942, the system of guarantees knownas Regulation V. Under
this procedure the War and NavyDepartments and the
Maritime Commissionagree, as was noted earlier, toguaran-
tee the fulfilment of loanagreements entered into inconnec-
tion with war contracts. In thefollowing October itwas
announced that the General MotorsCorporation had ar-
ranged a billion dollar credit, thelargest commercial credit
ever extended to a single corporation,in accordance with
these provisions. Thisagreement gave the corporation the
40right, for a period of ½ years, to call on approximately 400
financialinstitutions throughout the country for credit
accommodations up to the total indicated.
On the side of restricting the movement of capital, exist-
ing machinery is considerably less detailed and specific.
There are, of course, many institutions of the types men-
tioned above; and there are others whose operations, while
not primarily directed toward financialproblems, are of great
significance from the viewpoint of the financial consequences
of the war. The War Production Board and the Officeof
Price Administration constitute noteworthy examplesof such
organizations. To the extent that price control can be made
effective, by means of priorities, rationing and the imposition
of ceilings, inflation ceases to be a purely financialproblem.
The expansion of the circulating medium consequent upon
the tremendous volume of borrowing frombanks loses some-
thing of its forbidding aspect whenthis fact is taken into
consideration. It signifies that machinery exists, asit did not
in the last war, for curbing theinflationary forces which war
generates; it does not, of course, assurethat existing machin-
ery will prove adequate.Finally, so long as the government,
by rationing and priorities, cancontrol the supply of mate-
rials needed for certain types ofproduction it can govern
possible expansion to such a degree as tomake control over
a company'scapital flotation largely superfluous.
IN CONCLUSION
The temptation is strong to attempt, onthe basis of our
experience in the past war and thus farin this, to draw con-
clusions that will be applicable nowand in the future. Such
conclusions must, for the present, bestrictly avoided. And
even in an interpretationof the evidence thus farpresented
it must be pointed out thatwhile the course of events in
the two wars exhibits a high degreeof paralIclism differences
exist, both quantitative andqualitative which arc of primary
significance.
The fact that our formal entryinto the First World War
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caine 32 months, and into the Second World War 27 fliontlis.
after the outbreak of fighting in Europe completelyfails to
suggest the difference in the pace of our financial involve-
ment in the two wars. In the two years immediatelypreced-
ing the United States' entry into thewar in 1917. the dis-
bursements for the military establishmentwere reduced.
Only two months before that declaration ofwar Congress
was debating whether or not to prepare for war, and another
month elapsed before taxes topay for preparation were
actually voted. The period of deficit financingbegan about
the time of our entry into thewar in 1917, and deficits did
not reach extreme proportions until tile followingyear.
Tile experience of the Second WorldWar stands in sharp
contrast with these years. Froma financial and economic
viewpoint we had embarkedupon a war economy more than
a year before Pearl Harbor. It is not merely thatwe had been
supplying the Allies with ships andmaterials, that we had
been repairing their damagedwar vessels, that we bad been
at war in almost every sense except tile legal;it was also that
federal financing had movedon to a war footing. While
budgetary deficits had becomehardlylessapeacetime
phenomenon than balanced budgetshad been before1917,
nevertheless tile deficit of tile twelvemonths ending in De-
cember 1941 was nota peacetime deficit by any manner of
calculation. The increase ininterest-bearing debt in that
period was almost13 billion dollars. This amount is greatly
in excess of the deficit incurredin the fiscalyear following
the declaration ofwar in 1917, and is almost exactlyequal
to the largest deficit we hadever known in our history, that
of tile fiscal year 19 18-19.
Thus the beginning ofwar financing is to be placed from
twelve to fifteen months earlierin the secondwar than in
tile first. Moreover, the scaleof spending has been heavierin
this war, both absolutely and inrelation to national income.
It must also be rememberedthat we have the entireperiod of the first war to look backupon, while the presentwar
period is obviously far fromcomplete: the previouswar dis-
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.closes effects, while thepresent indicates only trends, with
the full effects still tocome. All of these rcscrvations must
be kept in mind in examining the implicationsof financial
policies in the two periods.
Both war periods are characterized by strikingchanges in
the way banking is carriedun. Some of these changes could
hardly have come about under normal peacetime conditions,
for one of the significant effects ofwar on banking is that the
usual canons of financial policycease to be decisive. A gov-
ernment must mobilize all the financial resources itmv
regard as necessary to its war plans, and the banksare socially
obligated to go along with thatprogram. Because of the
ability of the banking system to create the credit it provides,
banks occupy a residual position withrespect to government
borrowing. What cannot be obtained from othersources,
such as taxation and borrowing from the public,must pre-
sumably be furnished by the banks.
In ordinary times banks can decide whetheror not to
acquire particular assets; they can plan their portfoliosto
give the desired distribution of maturities; and theycan
express an effective preference as to the rate of interest they
will accept on the assets they acquire. These privilegesare
greatly circumscribed in time of war. Along with the decline
in their freedom to act independently, however,may go an
increase in the profitability of banking operations.
The First World War marked the beginning ofa period
of exceptional growth and prosperity for commercial banks.
In the four years from the middle of 1916 to the middle of
1920 the number of banks in the United States rose from
25,649 to 28,432 and their total assets from over 27 billion
dollars to 46 billion. Since the middle ofig, shortly before
the start of the present war, the number of banks has slightly
decreaseddeclining from 13,569 at that time to 13,399 in
the middle of 1942but total assets, as in the earlier period,
have shown a pronounced upward trend, rising from59.4 to
7.3 billion dollars. It is worth remarking that the present




in operation. It signifies that the enlarged volume of business
is not divided, as was the case before,among an increasing
Mimber of banks.
While earning assets increased markedly in both periods,
the character of the increase shows significant differences.
Approximately three-fourths of the increase in earningassets
from 1916 to 1920 was in the form of loans and discounts.
Not all of the added loans and discountswere of a commer-
cial character, sincea good many consisted of loans on the
collateral of government securities. Nevertheless,the growth
in earning assets during the First WorldWar was predomi-
nantly in the form of private credit, and thelarger part of
this private creditwas of nominally commercial character.
During the present war, however, thesituation has been very
different: three-fourths of the increasein earning assets be-
tWeen June 1939 and JuneJg!2 consisted of a growth in
government obligations. Only one-fourthwas in the form of
loans and discounts; duringpart of the period, indeed, the
total of loans and discounts exhibiteda downward trend.
From the viewpoint of bankingchanges, the period of the
First World Warwas notable for the expansion in the vol-
ume of business and for the beginning ofa policy of investing
heavily in government securities.Today bank assetsare again
expanding rapidly, but in this instancethe increase consists
chiefly of an accentuatedconcentration in government obli-.
gations. The first period initiateda trend toward greater
reliance upon investments, butleft the character of the bank-
ing system substantiallyas it was. The present periodprom-
ises to carry theconcentration of bank investments ingov-
ernment securities to a point wherebanking will occupya
fundamentally altered position inthe national economyas
compared with what it hasever had in the past. This change
is of the utmost significance,not only for the conduct and
safety of banks but also fortheir very existenceas private
enterprises.
The basic principles of Treasurypolicy in the presentwar
may be summarized as folLows:
44No undertaking essential to the war effort should be handicapped
by lack of funds;
Whatever funds are needed must be provided, for finance is the
servant, not the master, of wartime economic policy, and peace-
time conceptions of what is sound financial policy cannot be
allowed to interfere with the prosecution of the war;
It is desirable to obtain funds by taxation and by borrowing out
of current income (that is, to attempt to reduce the "inflationary
gap") but the banks will be called upon to supply whatever of
the government's financial requirements are not covered by those
means.
The principle that the financial needs of any vital enter-
prise should be fully met has been repeatedly emphasized.
It was exemplified in the establishment of the system of
credit guarantees known as Regulation V.
There can be few who would take exception to the view
that nothing should be allowed to impede the war effort,
that the war must be won regardless of financial or banking
difficulties. It may be well to bear in mind, however, that this
attitude, too, might prove dangerous: if it is interpreted to
mean that any course which takes account of financial or
banking difficulties would jeopardize the war effort, it can
serve as a ready excuse for the pursuit of careless and irre-
sponsible policies. Supporters of other policies are then placed
on the defensive, even though these other policies might con-
tribute as well to achieving ultimate victory, while moderat-
ing the risk of inflation. Indeed, it can be maintained with
excellent show of reason that policies which foster inflation
would by that very fact provide an impediment to the win-
ning of the war.
It was early recognized that the requirements of a war econ-
omy could be expected to expand consumerincomes and
restrict the supply of available goods, resulting in what is
frequently termed an "inflationary gap." Taxation and bor-
rowing out of income have been generally accepted as the
ideal means of "closing the gap," a view frequently endorsed
by public officials. Unforwnately, expenditure has been rising
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far more rapidly than receipts front taxation and borrowing
Out of current national income, and the Treasury, in pursu-
ance of the first two principles noted above, has looked to the
commercial banks to supply the remainder of its financial
requirements.
The net tendency of these general lines of Treasury policy,
so far as banking quantities are concerned, is strongly expan-
sionist. It may be accepted as an assured fact that the Treasury
will continue to borrow heavily from commercial banks. A
large increase in earning assets in the form ofgovernment
obligations and a corresponding increase in demand deposits
are therefore certainties upon which any discussion of the
future policy of bankers and of monetary and bankingauthor-
ities must be predicated. The precise magnitudes ofthe in.
creases are contingent upon such unknowns as the length of
the war and the nature of the readjustment thereafter;but
the increases themselves are certain.
Moreover, war finance, as our experience after the lastwar
demonstrates, does not end withwar. On Armistice Day, 1918,
the total national debt was19 billion dollar,; nine months
later it stood at a point almost40 percent above this figure,
26.3 billion. The peak rate ofgovernment expenditure, in
excess of 2 billion dollars a month, was not reached until the
month peace was declared, and it continuedat that level
through January. In other words,we spent money faster after
the war was over than while itwas going on.
Experience in the presentwar is hardly likely to repeat
exactly the pattern of the lastwar. War expenditure began
relatively earlier this time, andmay rise to a plateau rather
than to a peak. It is rather unlikely thatthe rate of spending
will move to still higher grounds whenpeace finally comes;
nevertheless it may be expected to remainfor SOme time ata
high level, and the national debtto continue to mount for an
uncertain length of time. Tile financialduration of the war,
in other words, is certainto extend far beyond its military
duration.
The observation that the national debtcan be expected to
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pcontinue its rise after the end of the war is much more than
an isolatedeconomic datum. Its practical importance lies in
the fact that it suggests the probable continuance of many of
those developments that have accompanied the wartime in-
crease in federal debt. it implies a further growth in bank
holdings of government obligations, a still greater expansion
of deposits and a continued decline in the capital ratio. In
fact, these tendencies may be accentuated, since the conclu-
sion of hostilities is likely to throw a greater immediate bur-
den on the banks by discouraging lending to the government
by individuals. At the same time, the end of the war can be
expected to render the problem of control more difficult by
strengthening popular resistance to the mass of restraints im-
posed under stress of war.
The clearest lesson that emerges from the financial experi-
ence of the last war is that the most critical phase may come
when the war itself is over. The course of financial develop-
ments in the present war points increasingly to the same con-
clusion, it constitutes a warning that must not be lost from
view.
The increase in government control over and participation
in economic affairs during the past decade is far more than a
change in the practice of government. It represents a basic
change in our economic environment, and it holds implica-
tions of the most far-reaching character. Not the least of these
is that it has made more difficult the task of analyzing the
probable consequences of economic developments now taking
place. it was formerly possible to predicate economic reason-
ing upon the assumption of a high degree of freedom in the
play of economic forces. The increased influence of the go-
ernment makes it possible that not all the consequenceswill
occur that might be anticipated under lessfettered conditions.
in other words, the fundamental change that has occurred
since the last war in the place occupied by government in
economic life has transformed the basis of economic predic-
tion. This calls for the utmost caution in evaluatingthe
probable consequences of present policies and trends.
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One is left, then, not with a conclusion but with the state-
ment of a problem. From this problem new questions spring.
and these questions are more important and perplexing than
any that have been answered. It will he the purpose of later
studies to examine questions such as these. For the present,
and as the only conclusion that is appropriate here, no more
can be done than to specify a few of the questions raised by
the foregoing analysis.
What measures need to be examined now with a view to
preparing for immediate postwar readjustments?
What can be done to restrain the inflationary tendencies
implicit in a greatly expanded money supply?
What can be done in the postwar period to equate money
income to the quantity of available goods?
How does the present method of financing through the
sale of securities direct to banks compare with the "borrow-
and-buy" policy employed in the last war?
\\rhat problems does the existence of a large war debtPre-
sent to the Federal Reserve System, and what modifications
in Reserve System structure and policy are called for in order
that these problems may be met?
What policies should be formulated now withrespect to
the eventual retirement of war debt?
What is the significance of the redemption rights accorded
to holders of War Savings Bonds? What steps might be taken
to prepare for possible future redemptions?
How may the existence ofa large public debt and a large
volume of deposits affect policies for the maintenanceof full
employment in the period after the war?
How may the existence of a large volume ofgovernment
obligations which cannot be sold freely affect themarket for
government securities?
What modification needs to be madewith respect to the
interpretation of the significance of capitalratios, and what
other criteria may be devised to aid in theguidance of bank
policy?
What new problems of liquidity andsolvency of the bank-
48ing system are suggested by the greatly expanded holdings of
government securities and the greater concentration of bank
earning assets in such holdings?
What are the implications of current changes in bank port-
folios in regard to the level and stability of bank profits in
the future?
NOTE BY GEORGE E. ROBERT5Disecros - The present study purports 10 5110W
the policies and methods by which the government, under the presidency of
Woodrow Wilson, financed itself during the First World War, and the policies
and methods by which the government, under the presidency of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. has thus far financed itself during the present war, and in
preparation therefor. This is a matter of great public interest, but I (1ucsuon
the propriety of making it the subject of a publication by the National Bureau.
In the first place, this body was organized more than twenty years ago on
the basis of a mutual understanding that it would confine its studies and
publications to statistical facts, with no comments beyond those necessary to
properly elucidate such facts. In other words, it was not to discuss issues.
theories or opinions, or attempt to deal with controversial subjects.It was
believed that such a fact-finding body would render a public service by
narrowing the scope of many controversies. As a member from tile beginning.
I cannot conceive how such a societyrepresentative (as our Board is) of
many conflicting views - could continue to function on any other basis.
Secondly, TheBankingSystemand War Financeundertakes to show the
effects of war financing on the banking system, and just how the banking
system was, and is. used by the government in the two warsall of which
is inextricably involved in the effects of both wars on the economic system as
a whole. The first was ended in 1918; President Roosevelt'sfirst term began
in 1933; the present war began in Europe in l9, and our own declaration
of entry was made in ti. But it would be quite impossible to understand
the policies of the present administration without having the whole story,
from the Wilson declaration of war in 1917 to the present time -- which
would inevitably include many highly controversial matters.
Dr. Whittlesey is aware of all this, and, mindful of the National Bureau's
long-established policy, has sought to avoid such matters as far as possible.
This occasions a break in the narrative which certainly would not occurif he
were writing for any publisher but the National Bureau.For example, on
pagehe says that "In the four yeats from the nsiddie of 1916 to themiddle
of 1920 the number of banks in the United States rose from 25,649 to28,432,"
and in the next sentence he says that "Since the middle of shortly before
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the start of the present war, the number of banks hasslightly decreasj.._.
declining from 13,569 at that time toiggin the middle Of 1942." Evidently
something happened to the banking system betweenthe middle 01 1920 and
the middle ofig,but the reader is left wholly in the dark thereon.More.
over, many other sensational events occurred, with importanteffects on both
the economic system and the bankingsystem, and most of them have been
acts of the Roosevelt administiation. For exanipIcdevaluation of the gold
dollar, resumption of silver purchases (stillcontinuing), enactments of the
AAA, NRA, NLRB, two Cutfey coalacts, the Wages and Hours Act, PWA,
Wl'A, also a gicat rise of the national debt(Overt before the new war began),
Referring again to war financing, it should besaid that the Wilson admin.
istration financed most of ihe earlierwar with 414 percent bonds, whilethe Roosevelt administration is gettingmost of its money at about one.halfthat rate.Moreover, the discount rates of the FederalReserve Banks during
%riboii.s administration rangedimiost of the time between41/2and 6 percent.
tchile now, in the midst of scar, theyare only 1of i percent. Why is this?
Again Dr. Whitticsey is silent, althoughdoubtless he knows, or hasan opinion. All of which leads mc to insist that theNational Bureau should notinvolve il.sclf in controversial subjccls




1National money income underestimates the amount available for the sup-
port of war financing. Gross national product, on the other hand, tends to
overestimate the amount. While neither concept is wholly satisfactory for
the comparisons presented in this paper, the former is more familiar and.
in addition, estimates regarding it are available for both war periods.
2At its head was a Liberty Loan Committee of twelve members, headed by
Governor Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. One of the
members was made executive manager, and sub-committees on distribution,
publicity and the handling of funds were created. Around each of these sub-
committees was built a further staff of such size and character as was appro-
priate for its purpose. Frank A. Vanderlip, who was a committee member,
made the interesting suggestion that the speakers' bureaus of the Republican
and Democratic parties be revived and incorporated into the publicity organ-
ization of the Treasury. In the course of time the Treasurys Speakers' Bureau,
with its thousands of Four Minute Men scattered throughout the country.
became one of the most effective parts of the entire loan organization.
SScarcely an avenue of attack was overlooked. As an example of the methods
used, April21,1918. was designated as Liberty Loan Sunday, and Secretary
McAdoo wrote to114,000clergymen asking them to devote their morning
sermons on that day to the loan.
The banks, it may be remarked, were subject to pressure the same as indi-
viduals. The severity of this pressure seems to have been greater in the early
campaigns, a possible indication that compulsion was later unnecessary. The
Comptroller of the Currency early announced that he would publish the
names of national banks which failed to support the Liberty Loan drives
actively. Seventy-three banks were listed as having failed to subscribe to the
First Liberty Loan either for their customers or for themselves. A similar
list for the Second Liberty Loan included only nineteen names. At about the
same time the Comptroller revoked the authority which had previously been
granted to organize a certain national bank, on the ground that the applicants
had contributed practically nothing to the Liberty Loans.
Later on the practice was followed of publicizing the banks that contrib-
uted liberally to the drives, rather than those that failed to do so. The
names of banks were published, with the amount of their subscriptions.
Citations were made for distinguished financial sets ice, the Citation being
accompanied by a display card to be exhibited by the bank. Banks were
listed on a Roll of Honor. And a hint was circulated that the Reserve Banks
would not help laggard banks ii they later came to need assistance.
In certain parts of the country where the population was largely German,
banks had to face the hostility of their customers if they took too active a
part in the loan campaigns. It is difficult to realize from this distance how
strong this sentiment was in some localities. Secretary McAdooissued an
announcement that if any bank that was threatened by Its depositorswould





for disloyalty. And Iowa passed the so-called "Spite Bank Bill,"giving the
Superintendent of Banks the power to veto the establishment ofnew banks.
In the debate on this measure it was declared that the lawwneeded be-
cause threats had been made that after the war new banks would beorgan.
lied to drive out of business banks that had disregarded thewishes of their
customers in supporting the war effort.
4several other categories of Treasury certificates, of whichthe following
are of particular interest, were issued during thewar. "Speqal debt certifi-
cates" consisted of miscellaneous short obligations, suchas one- or two-day
certificates to cover overdrafts on the Federal ReserveBanks. "Pitunan cer-
tificates" were issued in connection with the saleof silver to England. A
third type, war savings certifIcates, designed forsale to small savers,was
quite similar to the present War Savings Bonds.These were sold on a dis-
count basis, and they bore interest at aboutpercent, ranyears or a little
less, and originally had a maturity value of$. A total of gfii million dollars
of savings certificates was sold in 1918, andi6o million in 1919.
5These totals exclude loans secured bygovernment bonds; such loans are
discuied below in connection with banklending to the public.
6 It is important to recognizethat policies now followed withrespect to
financing on long or short terms willaffect the freedom of the authorities
to pursue particular policies at some futuretime. The same principle holds
with respect to other phases ofwar finance: present methods are settingthe stage for future policies.
TIn addition to borrowing of thetype just described,, a considerable volume
of borrowing on other types ofsecurity was used to finance thepurchase of
government bonds. No accurate measure ispossible that would indicate the
proportion of bank lending of this character.It is said that many individuals
sold other securities in orderto obtain funds with which to purchasebonds. flanks supported the market forsome of these securities, and the fundsso released may be considered to havefacilitated the sale ofgovernment bonds.
illustrations out of many will indicatethe numerous and ingenious
























parisOil it may be noted that life companies reportetl net purchases
of federal obligations amounting to2,500million dollars in isis. One large
life insurance company is said to have made purchases totaling250million
dollars in December igs.
sit may be thought of as supplementing the work of the War Finance Cor-
poration (see p.35).
10It is perhaps inevitable that central bank policies should be subordinated
to the wishes of the Treasuryin time of war. It appears that after the last
war, however, the dominationof the Treasury was unnecessarily prolonged.
There is reason to believe that Reserve Bank officials would have timed
their actions better, at least in the earlier postwar period, if they had felt
free to do so.
11The effect of this policy is to render relatively long.term government
securities as liquid as those with short maturities. In view of this, the present
wide disparity in yield on securities of differing maturity seemshardly
justified.
12It is worth noting thatOilthe day war was declared the Board of Gov-
ernors issued the followingsignificant announcement: "The System is pre-
pared to use its powers to assure that an ample supply of funds is available
at all times for financingthe war effort and to exert its influence toward
maintaining conditions in the United SLates Government security markct
that are satisfactory from the standpoint ofthe Government's requirements.'
13Quoted in Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67th Congress,First
Session, Hearing(1922)vol.2,p. 458.
14Trading in certificates of indebtedness at less than par wasprohibited
until May1950.
15From April 1917 to June 30, 1919, Treasurydeposits with commercial
banks rose from 35 to million dollars. During approximately the same
period total deposits rose from25.0tos.8 billion. Thus '3 percent of new
deposits were free of reserve requirements.
16These accounts are in the name of the FederalReserve Bank of the dis-
trict, as ftscal agent of the Treasury.
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